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We study the existence of allocations of indivisible goods that are envy-free up to one good (EF1), under the
additional constraint that each bundle needs to be connected in an underlying item graph G. When the items
are arranged in a path, we show that EF1 allocations are guaranteed to exist for arbitrary monotonic utility
functions over bundles, provided that either there are at most four agents, or there are any number of agents
but they all have identical utility functions. Our existence proofs are based on classical arguments from the
divisible cake-cuing seing, and involve discrete analogues of cut-and-choose, of Stromquist’s moving-knife
protocol, and of the Su-Simmons argument based on Sperner’s lemma. Sperner’s lemma can also be used to
show that on a path, an EF2 allocation exists for any number of agents. Except for the results using Sperner’s
lemma, all of our procedures can be implemented by ecient algorithms. Our positive results for paths imply
the existence of connected EF1 or EF2 allocations whenever G is traceable, i.e., contains a Hamiltonian path.
For the case of two agents, we completely characterize the class of graphs G that guarantee the existence of
EF1 allocations as the class of graphs whose biconnected components are arranged in a path. is class is
strictly larger than the class of traceable graphs; one can be check in linear time whether a graph belongs to
this class, and if so return an EF1 allocation.
1 INTRODUCTION
A famous literature considers the problem of cake-cuing [Brams and Taylor, 1996, Procaccia, 2016,
Robertson and Webb, 1998]. ere, a divisible heterogeneous resource (a cake, usually formalized
as the interval [0, 1]) needs to be divided among n agents. Each agent has a valuation function over
subsets of the cake, usually formalized as an atomless measure over [0, 1]. e aim is to partition
the cake into n pieces, and allocate each piece to one agent, in a “fair” way. By fair, we will mean
that the allocation is envy-free: no agent thinks that another agent’s piece is more valuable than
her own.
When there are two agents, the classic procedure of cut-and-choose can produce an envy-free
division: a knife is moved from le to right, until an agent shouts to indicate that she thinks the
pieces to either side are equally valuable. e other agent then picks one of the pieces, leaving
the remainder for the shouter. As is easy to see, the result is an envy-free allocation. For three or
more agents, nding an envy-free division has turned out to be much trickier. An early result by
Dubins and Spanier [1961] used Lyapunov’s eorem and measure-theoretic techniques to show,
non-constructively, that an envy-free allocation always exists. However, as Stromquist [1980]
memorably writes, “their result depends on a liberal denition of a ‘piece’ of cake, in which the
possible pieces form an entire σ -algebra of subsets. A player who only hopes for a modest interval
of cake may be presented instead with a countable union of crumbs.” In many applications of
resource allocation (such as land division, or the allocation of time slots), agents have lile use for
a severely disconnected piece of cake.
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Stromquist [1980] himself oered a solution, and gave a new non-constructive argument (using
topology) which proved that there always exists an envy-free division of the cake into intervals.
Forest Simmons later observed that the proof could be simplied by using Sperner’s lemma, and
this technique was subsequently presented in a paper by Su [1999]. For the three-agent case,
Stromquist [1980] also presented an appealing moving-knife procedure that more directly yields a
connected envy-free allocation. For n > 4 agents, no explicit procedures are known to produce
a connected envy-free allocation (i.e., an allocation where the cake is cut in exactly n − 1 places).
However, for n = 4, several moving-knife procedures exist that only need few cuts; for example, the
Brams–Taylor–Zwicker [1997] procedure requires 11 cuts, and a protocol of Barbanel and Brams
[2004] requires 5 cuts.
In many applications, the resources to be allocated are not innitely divisible, and we face the
problem of allocating indivisible goods. Most of the literature on indivisible goods has not assumed
any kind of structure on the item space, in contrast to the rich structure of the interval [0, 1] in
cake-cuing. us, there has been lile aention on minimizing the number of “cuts” required in
an allocation. However, in the kind of application that we mentioned (e.g., when the items have a
spatial or temporal structure), this consideration is important.
In this paper, we study the allocation of items that are arranged on a path or other structure, and
impose the requirement that only connected subsets of items may be allocated to the agents. Formally,
we work in the model of Bouveret et al. [2017], who assume that the items form the vertex set of a
graph G; a bundle is connected if it induces a connected subgraph of G. In their paper, it became
apparent that techniques from cake-cuing can be usefully ported to achieve good allocations in the
indivisible case. For example, moving-knife procedures that achieve proportionality in cake-cuing
have analogues that produce allocations that satisfy the maximin share guarantee [Budish, 2011].1
Do envy-free procedures for cake-cuing also translate to the indivisible case? Of course, in
general, it is impossible to achieve envy-freeness with indivisibilities (consider two agents and
a single desirable item), but we can look for approximations. A relaxation of envy-freeness that
has been very inuential recently is envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), introduced by Budish
[2011]. It requires that an agent’s envy towards another bundle vanishes if we remove some item
from the envied bundle. Caragiannis et al. [2016] show that, in the seing without connectivity
constraints and with additive valuations, the maximum Nash welfare solution satises EF1, as does
a simple round-robin procedure. e well-known envy-graph algorithm from Lipton et al. [2004]
also guarantees EF1. However, none of these procedures respects connectivity constraints.
When items are arranged on a path, we prove that connected EF1 allocations exist when there are
two, three, or four agents. As was necessary in cake-cuing, we use successively more complicated
tools to establish these existence results. For two agents, there is a discrete analogue of cut-and-
choose that satises EF1. In that procedure, a knife moves across the path, and an agent shouts
when the knife reaches what we call a lumpy tie, that is when the bundles to either side of the knife
have equal value up to one item. For three agents, we design an algorithm mirroring Stromquist’s
moving-knife procedure which guarantees EF1. For four agents, we show that Sperner’s lemma
can be used to prove that an EF1 allocation exists, via a technique inspired by the Simmons–Su
approach, and an appropriately triangulated simplex of connected partitions of the path. For ve
or more agents, we were not able to establish the existence of EF1 allocations on a path, but we
can show (again via Sperner’s lemma) that EF2 allocations exist, strengthening a prior result of
Suksompong [2017]. We also show that if all agents have the same valuation function over bundles,
then an egalitarian-welfare-optimal allocation, aer suitably reallocating some items, is EF1.
1Another paper by Suksompong [2017] works in the same model, and also found that procedures for proportionality and
other concepts can be applied to the indivisible seing.
2
ese existence results require only that agents’ valuations are monotonic (they need not
be additive), and in addition ensure that the constructed allocation satises the maximin share
guarantee (see Appendix A.1). Moreover, the fairness guarantee of our algorithms is slightly stronger
than the standard notion of EF1: in the returned allocations, envy can be avoided by removing just
an outer item – one whose removal leaves the envied bundle connected. Computationally speaking,
all our existence results are immediately useful, since an example of an EF1 allocation can be found
by iterating through all O(mn) connected allocation (this stands in contrast to cake-cuing where
we cannot iterate through all possibilities). While we know of no faster algorithms to obtain an
EF1 allocation in the cases where we appeal to Sperner’s lemma, our other procedures can all be
implemented eciently.
In simultaneous and independent work, Oh et al. [2018] designed protocols to nd EF1 allocations
in the seing without connectivity constraints, aiming for low query complexity. ey found that
adapting cake-cuing protocols to the seing of indivisible items arranged on a path is an especially
potent way to achieve low query complexity. is led them to also study a discrete version of the
cut-and-choose protocol which achieves connected EF1 allocations for two agents, and they found
an alternative proof that an EF1 allocation on a path always exists with identical valuations. ey
also present a discrete analogue of the Selfridge–Conway procedure which, for three agents with
additive valuations, produces an allocation of a path into bundles that have a constant number of
connected components. However, they do not study connected allocations on graphs that are not
paths, and they do not consider the case of non-identical valuations and more than two agents.
A recurring theme in our algorithms is the specic way that the moving knives from cake-cuing
are rendered in the discrete seing. While one might expect knives to be placed over the edges of
the path, and ‘move’ from edge to edge, we nd that this movement is too ‘fast’ to ensure EF1 (see
also footnote 5). Instead, our knives alternate between hovering over edges and items. When a
knife hovers over an item, we imagine the knife’s blade to be ‘thick’: the knife covers the item, and
agents then pretend that the covered item does not exist. ese intermediate steps are useful, since
they can tell us that envy will vanish if we hide an item from a bundle.
What about graphs G other than paths? Our positive results for paths immediately generalize
to traceable graphs (those that contain a Hamiltonian path), since we can run the algorithms
pretending that the graph only consists of the Hamiltonian path. For the two-agent case, we
completely characterize the class of graphs that guarantee the existence of EF1 allocations: Our
discrete cut-and-choose protocol can be shown to work on all graphs G that admit a bipolar
numbering, which exists if and only if the biconnected components (blocks) ofG can be arranged in
path. By constructing counterexamples, we prove that no graph failing this condition (for example,
stars) guarantees EF1, even for identical, additive, binary valuations. For the case of three or more
agents, it is a challenging open problem to characterize the class of graphs guaranteeing EF1 (or
even to nd an innite class of non-traceable graphs that guarantees EF1).
2 PRELIMINARIES
For each natural number s ∈ N, write [s] = {1, 2, . . . , s}.
Let N = [n] be a nite set of agents and G = (V ,E) be an undirected nite graph. We refer to
the vertices in V as goods or items. A subset I of V is connected if it induces a connected subgraph
G[I ] of G. We write C(V ) ⊆ 2V for the set of connected subsets of V . We call a set I ∈ C(V ) a
(connected) bundle. Each agent i ∈ N has a valuation function ui : C(V ) → R over connected
bundles, which we will always assume to be monotonic, that is, X ⊆ Y implies ui (X ) 6 ui (Y ). We
also assume that ui (∅) = 0 for each i ∈ N . Monotonicity implies that items are goods; we do not
consider bads (or chores) in this paper. We say that an agent i ∈ N weakly prefers bundle X to
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bundle Y if ui (X ) > ui (Y ); also, agent i ∈ N strictly prefers bundle X to bundle Y if ui (X ) > ui (Y ).2
A (connected) allocation is a function A : N → C(V ) assigning to each agent i ∈ N a connected
bundle A(i) ∈ C(V ) such that each item occurs in exactly one agent’s bundle, i.e., ⋃i ∈N A(i) = V
and A(i) ∩A(j) = ∅ whenever i , j.
We say that the agents have identical valuations when for all i, j ∈ N and every bundle I ∈ C(V ),
we have ui (I ) = uj (I ). A valuation function ui is additive if ui (I ) = ∑v ∈I ui ({v}) for each bundle
I ∈ C(V ). Many examples in this paper will use identical additive valuations, and will take G to
be a path. In this case, we use a succinct notation to specify these examples; the meaning of this
notation should be clear. For example, we write “2–1–3–1” to denote an instance with four items
v1,v2,v3,v4 arranged on a path, and where ui ({v1}) = 2, . . . , ui ({v4}) = 1 for each i . For such an
instance, an allocation will be wrien as a tuple, e.g., (2, 1–3–1) denoting an allocation allocating
bundles {v1} and {v2,v3,v4}, noting that with identical valuations it does not usually maer which
agent receives which bundle.
An allocation A is envy-free if ui (A(i)) > ui (A(j)) for every pair i, j ∈ N of agents, that is, if every
agent thinks that their bundle is a best bundle in the allocation. It is well-known that an envy-free
allocation may not exist (consider two agents and one good). e main fairness notion that we
study is a version of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), a relaxation of envy-freeness introduced by
Budish [2011] and popularized by Caragiannis et al. [2016], adapted to the model with connectivity
constraints. is property states that an agent i will not envy another agent j aer we remove some
single item from j’s bundle. Since we only allow connected bundles in our set-up, we may only
remove an item from A(j) if removal of this item leaves the bundle connected. us, our formal
denition of EF1 is as follows.
Denition 2.1 (EF1: envy-freeness up to one outer good). An allocation A satises EF1 if for any
pair i, j ∈ N of agents, either A(j) = ∅ or there is a good v ∈ A(j) such that A(j) \ {v} is connected
and ui (A(i)) > ui (A(j) \ {v}).
In the instance 2–1–3–1 for two agents, the allocation (2–1, 3–1) is EF1, since the le agent’s
envy can be eliminated by removing the item of value 3 from the right-hand bundle. However, the
allocation (2, 1–3–1) fails to be EF1 according to our denition, since eliminating either outer good
of the right bundle does not prevent envy.3
Denition 2.2. A graph G guarantees EF1 (for a specic number of agents n) if for all possible
monotonic valuations for n agents, there exists some connected allocation that is EF1. A graph
G guarantees EF1 for n agents and a restricted class of valuations if for all allowed valuations, a
connected EF1 allocation exists.
For reasoning about EF1 allocations, let us introduce a few shorthands. Given an allocation A we
will say that i ∈ N does not envy j ∈ N up to v if ui (A(i)) > ui (A(j) \ {v}). e up-to-one valuation
u−i : C(V ) → R>0 of agent i ∈ N is dened, for every I ∈ C(V ), as
u−i (I ) :=
{
0 if I = ∅,
min
{
ui (I \ {v}) : v ∈ I such that I \ {v} is connected
}
if I , ∅. (2.1)
us, an allocation A satises EF1 if and only if ui (A(i)) > u−i (A(j)) for any pair i, j ∈ N of agents.
2Our arguments only operate based on agents’ ordinal preferences over bundles, and the (cardinal) valuation functions are
only used for notational convenience. One exception, perhaps, is in Algorithm 1 where we calculate a leximin allocation,
but the algorithm can be applied aer choosing an arbitrary utility function consistent with the ordinal preferences.
3is example shows that our denition is strictly stronger than the standard denition of EF1 without connectivity
constraints. In the instance 2–1–3–1, considered without connectivity constraints, the allocation (2, 1–3–1) does satisfy EF1
since in the standard seing we are allowed to remove the middle item (with value 3) of the right bundle.
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As we show in the appendix in Example A.5, allocations satisfying a strengthened version of
EF1 called envy-freeness up to the least good (EFX) [Caragiannis et al., 2016, see also Plaut and
Roughgarden, 2018] may not exist on a path.
Given an ordered sequence of the vertices P = (v1,v2, . . . ,vm), and j,k ∈ [m] with j 6 k , we
denote the subsequence from vj to vk by P(vj ,vk ), i.e.,
P(vj ,vk ) = (vj ,vj+1, . . . ,vk−2,vk ).
With a lile abuse of notation, we oen identify a subsequence P(vj ,vk ) with the bundle of the
corresponding vertices. Let us dene L(vj ) = P(v1,vj−1) as the subsequence of vertices strictly le
of vj and R(vj ) = P(vj+1,vm) as the subsequence of vertices strictly right of vj . When G is a path,
in the following we always implicitly assume that its vertices v1,v2, . . . ,vm are numbered from
le to right according to the order they appear along the path, so that the set of the edges of G is
{{vj ,vj+1} : 1 6 j < m}. Each connected bundle in the path clearly corresponds to a subpath or
subsequence of the vertices. A Hamiltonian path of a graph G is a path that visits all the vertices of
the graph. A graph is traceable if it contains a Hamiltonian path.
3 EF1 EXISTENCE FOR TWO AGENTS
In cake-cuing for two agents, the standard way of obtaining an envy-free allocation is the cut-and-
choose protocol: Alice divides the cake into two equally-valued pieces, and Bob selects the piece
he prefers; the other piece goes to Alice. e same strategy almost works in the indivisible case
when items form a path; the problem is that Alice might not be able to divide the items into two
exactly-equal pieces. Instead, we ask Alice to divide the items into pieces that are equally valued
“up to one good”. e formal version is as follows. For a sequence of vertices P = (v1,v2, . . . ,vm)
and an agent i , we say that vj is the lumpy tie over P for agent i if j is the smallest index such that
ui (L(vj ) ∪ {vj }) > ui (R(vj )) and ui (R(vj ) ∪ {vj }) > ui (L(vj )). (3.1)
For example, when i has additive valuations 1–3–2–1–3–1, then the third item (of value 2) is the
lumpy tie for i , since 1 + 3 + 2 > 1 + 3 + 1 and 2 + 1 + 3 + 1 > 1 + 3. e lumpy tie always
exists: taking j to be the smallest index such that ui (L(vj ) ∪ {vj }) > ui (R(vj )) (which exists
as the inequality holds for j = m by monotonicity), the rst part of (3.1) holds. If j = 1, the
second part of (3.1) is immediate by monotonicity. If j > 1, then since j is minimal, we have
ui (L(vj )) = ui (L(vj−1) ∪ {vj−1}) < ui (R(vj−1)) = ui (R(vj ) ∪ {vj }) which is the second part of (3.1).
Using the concept of the lumpy tie, our discrete version of the cut-and-choose protocol is specied
as follows.
Discrete cut-and-choose protocol for n = 2 agents over a sequence P = (v1,v2, . . . ,vm):
Step 1. Alice selects her lumpy tie vj over (v1,v2, . . . ,vm).
Step 2. Bob chooses a weakly preferred bundle among L(vj ) and R(vj ).
Step 3. Alice receives the bundle of all the remaining vertices, including vj .
Intuitively, the protocol allows Alice to select an item vj that she will receive for sure, with
the advice that the two pieces to either side of vj should have almost equal value to her. en,
Bob is allowed to choose which side of vj he wishes to receive. In our example with valuations
1–3–2–1–3–1, Alice selects the lumpy tie of value 2, then Bob choses the bundle 1–3–1 to the right
and receives it, and Alice receives the bundle 1–3–2. e result is EF1, which is true in general.
Proposition 3.1. WhenG is a path and there are n = 2 agents, the discrete cut-and-choose protocol
yields an EF1 allocation.
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Proof. Clearly, the protocol returns a connected allocation. e returned allocation satises
EF1: Bob does not envy Alice up to item vj , since Bob receives his preferred bundle among L(vj )
and R(vj ). Also, by (3.1), Alice does not envy Bob, since Alice either receives the bundle L(vj )∪ {vj }
which she weakly prefers to Bob’s bundle R(vj ), or she receives the bundle R(vj ) ∪ {vj }, which she
weakly prefers to Bob’s bundle L(vj ). 
Proposition 3.1 implies that an EF1 allocation always exists on a path. It immediately follows
that an EF1 allocation exists for every traceable graph G: simply use the discrete cut-and-choose
protocol on a Hamiltonian path of G; the resulting allocation must be connected in G. In fact, the
discrete cut-and-choose protocol works on a broader class of graphs: We only need to require that
the vertices of the graph can be numbered in a way that the allocation resulting from the discrete
cut-and-choose protocol is guaranteed to be connected. Since the protocol always partitions the
items into an initial and a terminal segment of the sequence, such a numbering needs to satisfy the
following property.
Denition 3.2. A bipolar numbering of a graph G is an ordered sequence (v1,v2, . . . ,vm) of its
vertices such that for every j ∈ [n], the sets L(vj ) ∪ {vj } and R(vj ) ∪ {vj } are both connected in G.
An equivalent denition (which is the standard one) says that a numbering is bipolar if for every
j ∈ [n], the vertex vj has a neighbor that appears earlier in the sequence, and a neighbor that
appears later in the sequence. Bipolar numberings are used in algorithms for testing planarity
and for graph drawing. Every Hamiltonian path induces a bipolar numbering, but there are also
non-traceable graphs that admit a bipolar numbering, see Figure 1 for examples.
1 2
3
4
5 6 1 2
3
4
5
6 7 1
2
3
4
5
6
7 1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
Fig. 1. Non-traceable graphs with bipolar numberings.
Proposition 3.3. When there are n = 2 agents, then the discrete cut-and-choose protocol run on a
bipolar numbering of G yields an EF1 allocation.
Proof. e discrete cut-and-choose protocol always returns an allocation whose bundles are
either initial or terminal segments of the ordered sequence (v1,v2, . . . ,vm). By denition of a
bipolar numbering, such an allocation is connected. e argument of Proposition 3.1 shows that
the allocation satises EF1. 
It is clear that the discrete cut-and-choose protocol cannot be extended to graphs other than
those admiing a bipolar numbering. However, it could be that a dierent protocol is able to
produce EF1 allocations on other graphs. In the remainder of this section, we prove that this is not
the case: for n = 2 agents, a connected graph G guarantees the existence of an EF1 allocation if
and only if it admits a bipolar numbering. is completely characterizes the class of graphs that
guarantee EF1 existence in the two-agent case.4
4Note that no non-trivial disconnected graph guarantees EF1 for two agents: If G is disconnected, take a connected
component C with at least two vertices. Let both agents have additive valuations that value each item in C at 1, and value
items outside of C at 0. en, in a connected allocation, all items in C must go to a single agent, since the other agent needs
to receive items from another connected component. is induces envy in the other agent that is not bounded by one good.
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For a dierent number of agents, the class of graphs guaranteeing an EF1 allocation will be
dierent. In particular, the star with three leaves does not guarantee an EF1 allocation for two
agents (as it does not have a bipolar numbering, see below), but one can check that this star does
guarantee an EF1 allocation for three or more agents (see Example A.6 in the appendix).
3.1 Characterization of graphs guaranteeing EF1 for two agents
Based on a known characterization of graphs admiing a bipolar numbering, we characterize this
class in terms of forbidden substructures. We then show that these forbidden structures are also
forbidden for EF1: if a graph contains such a structure, we can exhibit an additive valuation prole
for which no EF1 allocation exists.
As a simple example, consider the star with three leaves, which is the smallest
connected graph that does not have a bipolar numbering. Suppose there are
two agents with identical additive valuations that value each item at 1. Any
connected allocation must allocate three items to one agent, and a single item
to the other agent. No such allocation is EF1, since the agent with the singleton bundle envies the
other agent, even up to one good. is star is an example of what we call a trident, and forms a
forbidden substructure. Informally, the forbidden substructures take one of two forms. A graph G
fails to admit a bipolar numbering, and fails to guarantee EF1 for two agents, i either
(a) there exists a vertex s whose removal from G leaves three or more connected components, or
(b) there are subgraphs C, P1, P2, P3 of G such that (i) G is the union of these subgraphs, (ii) the
subgraphs P1, P2, P3 are vertex-disjoint, (iii) C has exactly one vertex is common with Pi ,
i = 1, 2, 3, and (iv) no edge joins a vertex from one of these four subgraphs to a dierent one.
To reason about these structures, it is useful to consider the block decomposition of a graph, which
will show that graphs that admit a bipolar numbering have an underlying path-like structure. A
decomposition of a graph G = (V ,E) is a family {F1, F2, . . . , Ft } of edge-disjoint subgraphs of G
such that
⋃t
i=1 E(Fi ) = E where E(Fi ) is the set of edges of a subgraph Fi .
Denition 3.4. A vertex is called a cut vertex of a graph G if removing it increases the number of
connected components of G . A graph G is biconnected if G does not have a cut vertex. A block of G
is a maximal biconnected subgraph of G.
Equivalently, a block of a graph G can be dened as a maximal subgraph of G where each pair of
vertices lie on a common cycle [Bondy and Murty, 2008]. Given a connected graph G, we dene a
bipartite graph B(G) with bipartition (B, S), where B is the set of blocks of G and S is the set of cut
vertices of a graph G; a block B and a cut vertex v are adjacent in B(G) if and only if B includes v .
Since every cycle of a graph is included in some block, the graph B(G) is known to be a tree:
Lemma 3.5 (Bondy and Murty, 2008). Let G be a connected graph. en
• any two blocks of G have at most one cut vertex in common;
• the set of blocks forms a decomposition of G; and
• the graph B(G) is a tree.
us, for a connected graph G, we call B(G) the block tree of G. It turns out that G admits a
bipolar numbering if and only if B(G) is a path. For example, the graphs shown in Figure 1 all have
their blocks arranged in a path (so that B(G) is a path), as shown in Figure 2.
Lemma 3.6. A graph G admits a bipolar numbering if its block tree B(G) is a path.
Proof. Lempel et al. [1967] proved that G admits a bipolar numbering if there exist s, t ∈ V
such that adding an edge {s, t} to G makes the graph biconnected. Suppose B(G) is a path, and let
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Fig. 2. Block decompositions of graphs in Figure 1.
B1 and B2 be the leaf blocks at the ends of the path B(G). Take any s ∈ B1 and t ∈ B2. If we add the
edge {s, t} to G, then the graph becomes biconnected. Hence, G admits a bipolar numbering. 
Even and Tarjan [1976] provided a linear-time algorithm based on depth-rst search to construct
a bipolar numbering for any biconnected graph [see also Tarjan, 1986]. Using an algorithm by
Hopcro and Tarjan [1973] (also based on depth-rst search), we can calculate the block tree B(G)
of a given graph in linear time. us, in linear time, we can compute a bipolar numbering of a
graph whose block tree is a path, or establish that no bipolar numbering exists. Clearly, given a
bipolar numbering, the discrete cut-and-choose protocol can also be run in linear time.
Next, we show that if B(G) is not a path, then G cannot guarantee EF1. e proof constructs
explicit counter-examples, which have a very simple structure. We say that additive valuations ui
are binary if ui ({v}) ∈ {0, 1} for every v ∈ V .
Lemma 3.7. Let G be a connected graph whose block tree B(G) is not a path. en there exist
identical, additive, binary valuations over G for two agents such that no connected allocation is EF1.
Proof. If B(G) is not a path, then B(G) has a trident, i.e., a vertex with at least three neighbors,
and thus either
(a) there is a cut vertex s adjacent to three blocks B1, B2, and B3; or
(b) there is a block B adjacent to three dierent cut vertices s1, s2, and s3.
See Figure 3 for an illustration. In either case, we will construct identical additive valuations that
do not admit a connected EF1 allocation.
B2
B1 B3
(a) A cut vertex adjacent to three blocks
BB1 B3
B2
(b) A block adjacent to three cut vertices
Fig. 3. Tridents.
In case (a), for each i = 1, 2, 3, choose a vertex vi from Bi \ {s}. Note that we can choose such
vi , s due to the maximality of Bi . e two agents have utility 1 for s , v1, v2, and v3, and 0 for the
remaining vertices. Now take any connected allocation (I1, I2). One of the bundles, say I1, includes
the cut vertex s . en I2 can contain at most one of the vertices v1, v2, v3, since I2 is connected and
does not contain s yet any path between distinct vi and vj goes trough s . Hence ui (I2) 6 1. Now,
the bundle I1 contains s and at least two of v1, v2, v3, so ui (I1) > 3. us, the allocation is not EF1.
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In case (b), for each i = 1, 2, 3, let Bi be the block sharing the cut vertex si with B. Note that each
pair of the blocks B1,B2,B3 does not share any cut vertex because B(G) forms a tree. Choose a
vertex vi from Bi \ {si } for each i = 1, 2, 3. Again, one can choose vi , si due to the maximality of
Bi . e two agents have utility 1 for s1, s2, s3, v1, v2, and v3, and 0 for the remaining vertices. Now
take any connected allocation (I1, I2). One of the bundles, say I1, contains at least two cut vertices
si and the other contains at most one cut vertex si . Say that s1, s2 ∈ I1. Now, G \ {s1, s2} has three
connected components, and since I2 is connected, it must be contained in of these components.
But each component contains at most two vertices with utility 1, so ui (I2) 6 2. Since there are six
vertices with utility 1 in total, ui (I1) > 4. us, the allocation is not EF1. 
Combining these results, we obtain the promised characterization.
Theorem 3.8. e following conditions are equivalent for every connected graph G:
(1) G admits a bipolar numbering.
(2) G guarantees EF1 for two agents.
(3) G guarantees EF1 for two agents with identical, additive, binary valuations.
(4) e block tree B(G) is a path.
Proof. e implication (1) ⇒ (2) follows from Proposition 3.3 which shows that the discrete
cut-and-choose protocol yields a connected EF1 allocation when run on a bipolar numbering. e
implication (2) ⇒ (3) is immediate. e implication (3) ⇒ (4) follows from Lemma 3.7 which
proves the contrapositive. Finally, (4) ⇒ (1) follows from Lemma 3.6. 
e equivalence (2) ⇔ (3) is noteworthy and perhaps surprising: It is oen easier to guarantee
fairness when agents’ valuations are identical, yet in terms of the graphs that guarantee EF1 for
two agents, there is no dierence between identical and non-identical valuations. Intriguingly,
even for more than two agents, we do not know of a graph which guarantees EF1 for identical
valuations, but fails it for non-identical valuations.
4 EF1 EXISTENCE FOR THREE AGENTS: A MOVING-KNIFE PROTOCOL
→→ →→
L M R
We will now consider the case of three agents. Stromquist
[1980] designed a protocol that results in an envy-free
contiguous allocation of a divisible cake. In outline, the
protocol works as follows. A referee holds a sword over
the cake. Each of the three agents holds their own knife
over the portion of the cake to the right of the sword. Each
agent positions their knife so that the portion to the right
of the sword is divided into pieces they judge to have the same value. Now, initially, the sword is at
the le end of the cake and then starts moving at constant speed from le to right, while the agents
continuously move their knives to keep dividing the right-hand portion into equally-valued pieces.
At some point (when the le-most piece becomes valuable enough), one of the agents shouts “cut”,
and the cake will be cut twice: once by the sword, and once by the middle one of the three knives.
Agents shout “cut” as soon as the le piece is a highest-valued piece among the three. e agent
who shouts receives the le piece. e remaining agents each receive a piece containing their knife.
One can check that the resulting allocation is envy-free, since the agent receiving the le piece
prefers it to the other pieces, and the other agents who are not shouting receive at least half the
value of the part of the cake to the right of the sword.
Let G be a path, P = (v1,v2, . . . ,vm). ere are several diculties in translating Stromquist’s
continuous procedure to the discrete seing for G. First, agents need to divide the piece to the
9
right of the sword in half, and this might not be possible exactly given indivisibilities; but this can
be handled using our concept of lumpy ties from Section 3. Next, when the sword moves one item
to the right, the lumpy ties of the agents may need to jump several items to the right, for example
because the new member of the le-most bundle is very valuable. To ensure EF1, we will need to
smoothen these jumps, so that the middle piece grows one item at a time. Also, it will be helpful to
have the sword move in half-steps: it alternates between being placed between items (so it cuts the
edge between the items), and being placed over an item, in which case the sword covers the item
and agents ignore that item. Finally, while the sword covers an item, we will only terminate if at
least two agents shout to indicate that they prefer the le-most piece; this will ensure that there is
an agent who is exible about which of the bundles they are assigned. e algorithm moves in
steps, and alternates between moving the sword, and updating the lumpy ties.
In our formal description of the algorithm, we do not use the concepts of swords and knives.
Instead the algorithm, maintains three bundles L, M , and R that can be seen as resulting from
a certain conguration of these cuing implements. We also need a few auxiliary denitions.
Recall that for a subsequence of vertices P(vs ,vr ) = (vs ,vs+1, . . . ,vr ) and an agent i , we say that
vj (s 6 j 6 r ) is the lumpy tie over P(vs ,vr ) for i if j is the smallest index such that
ui (L(vj ) ∪ {vj }) > ui (R(vj )) and ui (R(vj ) ∪ {vj }) > ui (L(vj )). (4.1)
Here, the denitions of L(vj ) and R(vj ) apply to the subsequence P(vs ,vr ). e lumpy tie always
exists by the discussion aer equation (3.1). Each of the three agents has a lumpy tie over P(vs ,vr );
a key concept for us is the median lumpy tie which is the median of the lumpy ties of the three
agents, where the median is taken with respect to the ordering of P(vs ,vr ). We say that i ∈ N is a
le agent (respectively, a middle agent or a right agent) over P(vs ,vr ) if the lumpy tie for i appears
strictly before (respectively, is equal to, or appears strictly aer) the median lumpy tie. Note that
by denition of median, there is at most one le agent, at most one right agent, and at least one
middle agent.
Suppose that the median lumpy tie over the subsequence P(vs ,vr ) is vj , and let i be an agent.
en using the denitions of lumpy tie and le/right agents, we nd that
ui (L(vj )) > ui (R(vj ) ∪ {vj }) if i is a le agent, and
ui (R(vj )) > ui (L(vj ) ∪ {vj }) if i is a right agent. (4.2)
Given the median lumpy tievj over the subsequence P(vs ,vr ), and a two-agent set S = {i,k} ⊆ N ,
we dene Lumpy(S,vj , P(vs ,vr )) to be the allocation of the items in P(vs ,vr ) to S such that
• if i is a le agent and k is a right agent, then i receives L(vj ) and k receives R(vj ) ∪ {vj };
• if i is a middle agent, then agent k receives k’s preferred bundle among L(vj ) and R(vj ),
and agent i receives the other bundle along with vj .
Using (4.1) and (4.2), we see that Lumpy(S,vj , P(vs ,vr )) is an EF1 allocation:
Lemma 4.1 (Median Lumpy Ties Lemma). Suppose that S = {i,k} ⊆ N and vj is the median
lumpy tie over the subsequence P(vs ,vr ). en Lumpy(S,vj , P(vs ,vr )) is an EF1 allocation of the
items in P(vs ,vr ) to S . Furthermore, each agent in S receives a bundle weakly beer than the two
bundles L(vj ) and R(vj ).
We now present the algorithm. e algorithm alternately moves a le pointer ` (in Steps 2 and
3) and a right pointer r (in Step 4). It also maintains bundles L, M , and R during the execution of
the algorithm.
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Discrete moving-knife protocol for n = 3 agents over a sequence P = (v1,v2, . . . ,vm):
An agent i ∈ N is a shouter if L is best among L,M,R, so that ui (L) > ui (M) and ui (L) > ui (R).
Step 1. Initialize ` = 0 and set r so that vr is the median lumpy tie over the subsequence P(v2,vm).
Initialize L = ∅, M = {v2,v3, . . . ,vr−1}, and R = {vr+1,vr+2, . . . ,vm}.
Step 2. Add an additional item to L, i.e., set ` = ` + 1 and L = {v1,v2, . . . ,v`}.
If no agent shouts, go to Step 3. If some agent sle shouts, sle receives the le bundle L.
Allocate the remaining items according to Lumpy(N \ {sle},vr , P(v`+1,vm)).
before v` vr
L M R
aer v` vr
L M R
sle divided among the remaining agents
Step 3. Delete the le-most point of the middle bundle, i.e., set M = {v`+2,v`+3, . . . ,vr−1}.
If the number of shouters is smaller than two, go to Step 4. If at least two agents shout, we
show (next page) that there is a shouter s who is a middle agent over P(v`+1,vm). en,
allocate L to a shouter sle distinct from s . Let the agent c distinct from s and sle choose
his preferred bundle among {v`+1} ∪M and {vr } ∪ R. Agent s receives the other bundle.
before v` vr
L M R
aer v` vr
L M R
sle s or c s or c
Step 4. If vr is the median lumpy tie over P(v`+2,vm), directly move to the following cases (a)–(d).
Ifvr is not the median lumpy tie over P(v`+2,vm), set r = r +1, M = {v`+2,v`+3, . . . ,vr−1},
and R = {vr+1,vr+2, . . . ,vm}; then, consider the following cases (a)–(d).
(a) If at least two agents shout, nd a shouter s who did not shout at the previous step. If
there is a shouter sle who shouted at the previous step, sle receives L; else, give L to
an arbitrary shouter sle distinct from s . e agent c distinct from s and sle choose
his preferred bundle among {v`+1} ∪M and {vr } ∪ R, breaking ties in favor of the
former option. Agent s receives the other bundle.
(b) If vr is the median lumpy tie over P(v`+2,vm) and only one agent sle shouts, give
L ∪ {v`} to sle and allocate the rest according to Lumpy(N \ {sle},vr , P(v`+2,vm)).
(c) If vr is the median lumpy tie over P(v`+2,vm) but no agent shouts, go to Step 2.
(d) Otherwise vr is not the median lumpy tie over P(v`+2,vm): Repeat Step 4.
before v` vr
L M R
aer v` vr
L M R
4(a) sle s or c s or c
4(b) sle divided by the remaining agents
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Theorem 4.2. e moving-knife protocol nds an EF1 allocation for three agents and runs inO(|V |)
time, when G is traceable.
Proof. e algorithm is well-dened – there is one place where this is not immediate: If two
agents shout in Step 3, the algorithm description claims that there is a shouter who is a middle
agent over the subsequence P(v`+1,vm). Suppose for the moment that there is a shouter i who
is a right agent. Due to (4.2), we have ui (R) > ui ({v`+1} ∪ M ∪ {vr }). Since i is a shouter, we
have ui (L) > ui (R), so ui (L) > ui ({v`+1} ∪ M ∪ {vr }). But i did not shout in the previous Step
2 (when no-one shouted), so either ui (R) > ui (L) or ui ({v`+1} ∪M) > ui (L), and either case is a
contradiction. Hence neither of the at least two shouters of Step 3 is a right agent, so at least one
shouter is a middle agent, since there is at most one le agent.
e algorithm terminates and returns an allocation, since the bundle L grows throughout the
algorithm until eventually, at least two agents will think that L is the best bundle and thus will
shout and thereby terminate the algorithm. We will now consider every possible way that the
algorithm could have terminated, and show that the resulting allocation is EF1. To follow this
proof, it is helpful to look at the gures in the description of the procedure.
Step 2.
• Agent sle receives L and does not envy the other agents (up to good vr ) since sle is a shouter.
• An agent i who is not a shouter does not envy sle because i prefers either M or R to L, and
hence by Lemma 4.1 receives a bundle preferred to L.
Agent i also does not envy the other agent j , sle up to one good by Lemma 4.1.
• An agent i , sle who is a shouter does not envy sle up to one good: If this is the rst time
Step 2 was performed, then L = {v1}, so i does not envy sle up to v1. Otherwise, the last step
was an iteration of Step 4(c), where by denition of Step 4(c) no-one shouted. Since i did not
shout during Step 4(c), and Step 2 did not change the bundles M and R, then i strictly prefers
either M or R to the le bundle L \ {v`} of Step 4(c). By Lemma 4.1, agent i gets a bundle at
least as good as M or R. us, i does not envy sle up to v` .
Also by Lemma 4.1, agent i does not envy the other agent j , sle up to one good.
Step 3.
• Agent sle receives L and, because sle shouted, does not envy the bundle {v`+1} ∪M up to
good v`+1, and does not envy the bundle {vr } ∪ R up to good vr .
• Agent c gets his preferred bundle among {v`+1} ∪M and {vr } ∪R, and so does not envy agent
s who receives the other bundle. Further, agent c does not envy agent sle since c did not shout
at the last Step 2 (where no-one shouted), which, since bundle L did not change in Step 3,
means that c prefers either {v`+1} ∪M or R to L, and hence also prefers his chosen bundle to L.
• Agent s is a middle agent, so the lumpy tie of s over P(v`+1,vm) is vr , and hence by (4.1),
us ({vr } ∪ R) > us ({v`+1} ∪M). (4.3)
Now, agent s did not shout at the preceding Step 2 (when no-one shouted). However, s does
shout aer deleting v`+1 from M . Since L and R have not changed, the reason s did not shout
at Step 2 was that L is worse than the middle bundle during Step 2, so
us ({v`+1} ∪M) > us (L). (4.4)
Combining (4.3) and (4.4), we also have
us ({vr } ∪ R) > us (L).
Since s receives either {v`+1} ∪M or {vr } ∪ R, agent s does not envy agent sle receiving L.
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Finally, from (4.3), agent s weakly prefers {vr }∪R to {v`+1}∪M . us, if c picks {v`+1}∪M ,
then s does not envy c . On the other hand, if c picks the bundle {vr } ∪ R, then s does not envy
c up to good vr : we have us (L) > us (R) since s shouts, and so by (4.4), also
us ({v`+1} ∪M) > us (R).
Step 4(a). We rst prove that if i is a shouter who did not shout in the previous step, then
ui ({vr } ∪ R) > ui (L) > ui (M). (4.5)
In the previous step (which was either Step 3 or Step 4), the middle bundle was M \ {vr−1} and the
right bundle was {vr } ∪R. (While Step 4 allows for the possibility that the middle and right bundles
are not changed in Step 4, this is not the case if we enter Step 4(a): if the bundles are unchanged and
two agents shout, these agents already shouted in Step 3, contradicting that we did not terminate
then.) Since i did not shout with the middle and right bundles of the previous step, we have
ui (M \ {vr−1}) > ui (L) or ui ({vr } ∪ R) > ui (L).
Since i is a shouter, ui (L) > ui (M), so that the rst case is impossible by monotonicity. Hence
ui ({vr } ∪ R) > ui (L), showing (4.5), when combined with ui (L) > ui (M).
• Agent sle receives L and does not envy other agents up to one good like in Step 3.
• Agent c gets his preferred bundle among {v`+1} ∪ M and {vr } ∪ R, and so does not envy
agent s who receives the other bundle. Agent c also does not envy sle: If c is not a shouter,
then c does not envy sle because c prefers either M or R to L, and hence prefers his picked
piece to L. If c is a shouter, then all three agents are shouters, and by choice of c , this means
that c was not a shouter at the previous step, when there was at most one shouter. By (4.5),
uc ({vr } ∪ R) > uc (L), and hence
max{uc ({v`+1} ∪M),uc ({vr } ∪ R)} > uc (L),
so that c does not envy sle.
• Agent s does not envy others up to one good:
– Suppose agent c strictly prefers {vr } ∪ R to {v`+1} ∪M . en agent c’s lumpy tie over
P(v`+1,vm) appears at or aer vr by denition of the lumpy tie. As we argued before, the
bundles M and R were changed in the execution of Step 4, and r was increased by 1. us,
vr appears strictly aer the median lumpy tie over P(v`+1,vm). us, c is the right agent
over P(v`+1,vm). Hence s is either a le or middle agent over P(v`+1,vm) since there is at
most one right agent. Using (4.1) or (4.2), this implies
us ({v`+1} ∪M) > us ({vr } ∪ R), (4.6)
so that s does not envy c .
By denition of s , agent s did not shout in the previous step. By (4.5), us ({vr }∪R) > us (L),
so together with (4.6), we have us ({v`+1} ∪M) > us (L), so s does not envy sle.
– Suppose c weakly prefers {v`+1} ∪M to {vr } ∪ R. en s receives the bundle {vr } ∪ R
(since c breaks ties in favor of {v`+1} ∪M). By choice of s , agent s did not shout at the last
step. So by (4.5), we have us ({vr } ∪ R) > us (L) so that s does not envy sle, and also by
(4.5), we have us ({vr } ∪ R) > us (M) so that s does not envy c up to item v`+1.
Step 4(b).
• Agent sle gets L∪ {v`+1} and does not envy the other agents (up to good vr ) as sle shouts.
• Any agent i , sle is not a shouter, and thus prefers either M or R to L. Hence by Lemma
4.1 receives a bundle preferred to L, and so does not envy sle up to item v`+1.
Agent i also does not envy the other agent j , sle up to one good by Lemma 4.1.
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us, the allocation returned by any of the steps satises EF1.
Our algorithm can be implemented in O(m) time: Each of steps 2, 3, and 4 will be executed at
most m times (since ` and r can only be incremented m times). Each step execution only needs
constant time: In each step, we need to check which agents shout, and this can be done in a constant
number of queries to agents’ valuations; also, in Step 4 we need to calculate the lumpy ties of the
agents, but this can be done in amortized constant time, since during the execution of the algorithm,
the position of each agent’s lumpy tie can only move to the right. Finally, when enough agents
shout, we can clearly compute and return the nal allocation in O(m) time. 
5 EF2 EXISTENCE FOR ANY NUMBER OF AGENTS
For two or three agents, we have seen algorithms that are guaranteed to nd an EF1 allocation on
a path (and on traceable graphs). Both algorithms were adaptations of procedures that identify
envy-free divisions in the cake-cuing problem. For the case of four or more agents, we face a
problem: there are no known procedures that nd connected envy-free division in cake-cuing if
the number of agents is larger than three. However, in the divisible seing, a non-constructive
existence result is known: Su [1999] proved, using Sperner’s lemma, that for any number of agents,
a connected envy-free division of a cake always exists. One might try to use this result as a black
box to obtain a fair allocation for the indivisible problem on a path: Translate an indivisible instance
with additive valuations into a divisible cake (where each item corresponds to a region of the cake),
obtain an envy-free division of the cake, and round it to get an allocation of the items. Suksompong
[2017] followed this approach and showed that the result is an allocation where any agent i’s envy
ui (A(j)) − ui (A(i)) is at most 2umax, where umax is the maximum valuation for a single item.
In this section, rather than using Su’s [1999] result as a black box, we directly apply Sperner’s
lemma to the indivisible problem. is allows us to obtain a stronger fairness guarantee: We show
that on paths (and on traceable graphs), there always exists an EF2 allocation.5 An allocation is EF2
if any agent’s envy can be avoided by removing up to two items from the envied bundle. Again, we
only allow removal of items if this operation leaves a connected bundle. For example, on a path,
if agent i envies the bundle of agent j, then i does not envy that bundle once we remove its two
endpoints. e formal denition for general graphs is as follows.
Denition 5.1 (EF2: envy-freeness up to two outer goods). An allocation A satises EF2 if for any
pair i, j ∈ N of agents, either |A(j)| 6 1, or there are two goods u,v ∈ A(j) such that A(j) \ {u,v} is
connected and ui (A(i)) > ui (A(j) \ {u,v}).
∅, ∅,abcd ∅,a,bcd ∅,ab, cd ∅,abc,d ∅,abcd, ∅
a, ∅,bcd a,b, cd a,bc,d a,bcd, ∅
ab, ∅, cd ab, c,d ab, cd, ∅
abc, ∅,d abc,d, ∅
abcd, ∅, ∅
Fig. 4. Connected partitions form a subdivided simplex
Let us rst give a high-level illustration
with three agents of how Sperner’s lemma
can be used to nd low-envy allocations.
Given a path, say P = (a,b, c,d), the fam-
ily of connected partitions of P can naturally
be arranged as the vertices of a subdivided
simplex, as in Figure 4 on the right. For each
of these partitions, each agent i labels the cor-
responding vertex by the index of a bundle
from that partition that i most-prefers. For
example, the top vertex will be labelled as “in-
dex 1” by all agents, since they all most-prefer
the le-most bundle in (abcd, ∅, ∅). Now,
5To see that EF2 is a stronger property than bounding envy up to 2umax, consider a path of four items and two agents with
additive valuations 1–10–2–1. e allocation (1, 10–2–1) is not EF2, but the rst agent has an envy of 12 < 20 = 2umax.
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Sperner’s lemma will imply that at least one of the simplices (say the shaded one) is “fully-labeled”,
which means that the rst agent most-prefers the le-most bundle at one vertex, the second agent
most-prefers the middle bundle at another vertex, and the third agent most-prefers the right-most
bundle at the last vertex. Notice that the partitions at the corner points of the shaded simplex are
all “similar” to each other (they can be obtained from each other by moving only 1 item). Hence,
we can “round” the corner-partitions into a common allocation A∗, say by picking one of the corner
partitions arbitrarily and then allocating bundles to agents according to the labels. e resulting
allocation has the property that any agents’ envy can be eliminated by moving at most one good.6
e argument sketched above does not yield an EF1 nor even an EF2 allocation. Intuitively, the
problem is that the connected partitions at the corners of the fully-labeled simplex are “too far
apart”, so that no maer how we round the corner partitions into a common allocation A∗, some
agents’ bundles will have changed too much, and so we cannot prevent envy even up to one or two
goods. In the following, we present a solution to this problem, by considering a ner subdivision:
we introduce n − 1 knives which move in half-steps (rather than full steps), and which might ‘cover’
an item so that it appears in none of the bundles. e result is that the partial partitions in the
corners of the fully-labeled simplex are closer together, and can be successfully rounded into an
EF2 allocation A∗.
In our approach, we use a specic triangulation (Kuhn’s triangulation). is triangulation has the
needed property that the partitions at the corners of sub-simplices are close together, and adjacent
partitions can be obtained from each other in a natural way. While this type of triangulation has
also been used in cake-cuing [e.g., Deng et al., 2012], there it was only used to speed-up algorithms
(compared to the barycentric subdivision used by Su [1999]), not to obtain beer fairness properties.
5.1 Sperner’s lemma
We start by formally introducing Sperner’s lemma. Let conv(v1,v2, . . . ,vk ) denote the convex
hull of k vectors v1,v2, . . . ,vk . An n-simplex is an n-dimensional polytope which is the convex
hull of its n + 1 main vertices. A k-face of the n-simplex is the k-simplex formed by the span of any
subset of k + 1 main vertices. A triangulation T of a simplex S is a collection of sub-n-simplices
whose union is S with the property that the intersection of any two of them is either the empty set,
or a face common to both. Each of the sub-simplices S∗ ∈ T is called an elementary simplex of the
triangulation T . We denote by V (T ) the set of vertices of the triangulation T , which is the union of
vertices of the elementary simplices of T .
Let T be some xed triangulation of an (n − 1)-simplex S = conv(v1,v2, . . . ,vn). A labeling
function is a function L : V (T ) → [n] that assigns a number in [n] (called a color) to each vertex of
the triangulation T . A labeling function L is called proper if
• For each main vertexvi of the simplex, L assigns color i tovi : L(vi ) = i; and
• L(v) , i for any vertexv ∈ V (T ) belonging to the (n − 2)-face of S not containingvi .
Sperner’s lemma states that if L is a proper labeling function, then there exists an elementary
simplex of T whose vertices all have dierent labels.
We will consider a generalized version of Sperner’s lemma, proved, for example, by Bapat [1989].
In this version, there are n labeling functions L1, . . . ,Ln , and we are looking for an elementary
simplex which is fully-labeled for some way of assigning labeling functions to vertices, where we
must use each labeling function exactly once. e formal denition is as follows.
6One can generalize this argument to show that on paths, there exists an allocation A satisfying a weak form of EF1: for any
i, j ∈ [n], we have ui (Ii ∪ {дi }) > ui (Ij \ {дj }) for some items дi , дj such that Ii ∪ {дi } and Ij \ {дj } are connected. For
additive valuations, this implies that envy is bounded by ui (дi ) + ui (дj ) 6 2umax, which is Suksompong’s [2017] result.
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Denition 5.2 (Fully-labeled simplex). Let T be a triangulation of an (n − 1)-simplex, and let
L1, . . . ,Ln , be labeling functions. An elementary simplex S∗ of T is fully-labeled if we can write
S∗ = conv(v∗1,v∗2, . . . ,v∗n) such that there exists a permutation ϕ : [n] → [n] with
Li (v∗i ) = ϕ(i) for each i ∈ [n].
Our generalized version of Sperner’s lemma guarantees the existence of a fully-labeled simplex.
Lemma 5.3 (Generalized Sperner’s Lemma). Let T be a triangulation of an (n − 1)-simplex S ,
and let L1, . . . ,Ln be proper labeling functions. en there is a fully-labeled simplex S∗ of T .
5.2 Existence of EF2 allocations
Suppose that our graph G is a path P = (1, 2, . . . ,m), where the items are named by integers. We
assume thatm > n, so that there are at least as many items as agents (whenm < n it is easy to nd
EF1 allocations). Our aim is to cut the path P into n intervals (bundles) I 1∗ , I 2∗ , . . . , In∗ . roughout
the argument, we will use superscripts to denote indices of bundles; index 1 corresponds to the
le-most bundle and index n corresponds to the right-most bundle.
Construction of the triangulation. Consider the (n − 1)-simplex7
Sm = { x ∈ Rn−1 : 12 6 x1 6 x2 6 . . . 6 xn−1 6m + 12 }. (5.1)
We construct a triangulation Thalf of Sm whose vertices V (Thalf ) are the points x ∈ Sm such that
each x j is either integral or half-integral, namely,
V (Thalf ) = {x ∈ Sm : x j ∈ { 12 , 1, 32 , 2, 52 . . . ,m,m + 12 } for all j ∈ [n]}.
For reasons that will become clear shortly, we call a vector x ∈ V (Thalf ) a knife position.
Using Kuhn’s triangulation [Kuhn, 1960, see also Scarf, 1982, Deng et al., 2012], we can construct
Thalf so that each elementary simplex S ′ ∈ Thalf can be wrien as S ′ = conv(x1,x2, . . .xn) such
that there exists a permutation pi : [n] → [n] with
x i+1 = x i +
1
2e
pi (i) for each i ∈ [n − 1], (5.2)
where ej = (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0) is the j-th unit vector. We give an interpretation of (5.2) shortly.
Each vertex x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn−1) ∈ V (Thalf ) of the triangulation Thalf corresponds to a partial
partition A(x) = (I 1(x), I 2(x), . . . , In(x)) of P where
I j (x) := {y ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} : x j−1 < y < x j },
writing x0 = 12 and x
n = m + 12 for convenience. Note the strict inequalities in the denition of
I j (x). Intuitively, x species the location of n − 1 knives that cut P into n pieces. If x j is integral,
that is x j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then the j-th knife ‘covers’ the item x j , which is then part of neither I j (x)
nor I j+1(x). is is why A(x) is a partial partition. Since there are only n − 1 knives but m > n
items, not all items are covered, so at least one bundle is non-empty.
Property (5.2) means that, if we visit the knife positions x1,x2, . . .xn at the corners of an
elementary simplex in the listed order, then at each step exactly one of the knives moves by half a
step, and each knife moves only at one of the steps.
7e simplex Sm is anely equivalent to the standard (n − 1)-simplex ∆n−1 = {(l1, . . . , ln ) > 0 : ∑ li = 1} via
xi =m · (l1 + l2 + · · · + li ) + 12 . In these coordinates, li is the length of the ith piece (times 1/m).
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Construction of the labeling functions. We now construct, for each agent i ∈ [n], a labeling
function Li : V (Thalf ) → [n]. e function Li takes as input a vertex x of the triangulation Thalf
(interpreted as the partial partition A(x)), and returns a color in [n]. e color will specify the index
of a bundle in A(x) that agent i likes most. Formally,
Li (x) ∈ {j ∈ [n] : ui (I j (x)) > ui (Ik (x)) for all k ∈ [n]}.
If there are several most-preferred bundles in A(x), ties can be broken arbitrarily. However, we
insist that the index Li (x) always corresponds to a non-empty bundle (this can be ensured since
A(x) always contains a non-empty bundle, and ui is monotonic).
e labeling functions Li are proper. For each j ∈ [m], the main vertex v j of the simplex Sm
has the form v j = ( 12 , . . . , 12 ,m + 12 , . . . ,m + 12 ), where the rst j − 1 entries are 12 and the rest
arem + 12 . is vertex corresponds to a partition A(v j ) where I j (v j ) contains all the items, hence
is most-preferred (since ui is monotonic and by our tie-breaking), and so Li (v j ) = j. Further,
any vertex x belonging to the (n − 2)-face of Sm not containing v j satises x j−1 = x j , and thus
corresponds to a partition A(x) where I j (x) is empty, hence is not selected, and so Li (x) , j.
By the generalized version of Sperner’s lemma (Lemma 5.3), there exists an elementary sim-
plex S∗ = conv(x1,x2, . . . ,xn) of the triangulation Thalf which is fully-labeled, so that, for some
permutation ϕ : [n] → [n], we have Li (x i ) = ϕ(i) for all i ∈ [n].
Translation into partial partitions. e fully-labeled elementary simplex S∗ corresponds to a
sequence (A1,A2, . . . ,An) of partial partitions of P , which we call the Sperner sequence, where
Ai = (I 1i , . . . , Ini ) := A(x i ) for each i ∈ [n]. An example of a Sperner sequence is shown in Figure 5,
which also illustrates other concepts that we introduce shortly. From the labeling, for each agent
i ∈ [n], since Li (x i ) = ϕ(i), the bundle with index ϕ(i) in the partition Ai is a best bundle for i:
ui (Iϕ(i)i ) > ui (I ji ) for each j ∈ [n]. (5.3)
Now, for each j ∈ [n], we dene the basic bundle B j := I j1 ∩ · · · ∩ I jn to be the bundle of items that
appear in the j-th bundle of every partition in the Sperner sequence. e set of basic bundles is a
partial partition. Let us analyze the items between basic bundles.
From (5.2), each of the n − 1 knives moves exactly once, by half a step, while passing through
the Sperner sequence (A1,A2, . . . ,An). us, the numbers x j1, . . . ,x jn take on two dierent values,
one of which is integral and the other half-integral. We write y j for the integral value (so y j = x ji
for some i ∈ [n]), and call y j a boundary item. e j-th knife covers the item y j in some, but not all,
of the partial partitions in the Sperner sequence. Now, there are two cases:
(a) x j1 = · · · = x ji = y j − 12 and then x ji+1 = · · · = x jn = y j for some i ∈ [n], so that y j never occurs
in the j-th bundle in the Sperner sequence but sometimes occurs in the j + 1st bundle, or
(b) x j1 = · · · = x ji = y j and then x ji+1 = · · · = x jn = y j + 12 for some i ∈ [n], so that y j sometimes
occurs in the j-th bundle in the Sperner sequence but never occurs in the j + 1st bundle.
Since y j is sometimes covered by a knife, it is not part of any basic bundle. However, we have that
B j ⊆ I ji ⊆ {y j−1} ∪ B j ∪ {y j } for every i, j ∈ [n]. (5.4)
Rounding into a complete partition. We now construct a complete partition (I 1∗ , I 2∗ , . . . , In∗ ) of the
path P . We dene each bundle as follows:
I j∗ := I
j
1 ∪ · · · ∪ I jn for each j ∈ [n].
us, the bundle I j∗ contains the basic bundle B j , plus all of the boundary items y j−1 or y j that occur
in the j-th bundle at some point of the Sperner sequence. Precisely, for each boundary item y j ,
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2 1
3
2 2
5
2 · · · · · · m + 12
A1 y1 y2 y3
A2 y1 y2 y3
A3 y1 y2 y3
A4 y1 y2 y3
B1 B2 B3 B4
A∗ y1 y2 y3
Fig. 5. Example of the Sperner sequence A1, . . . ,A4 for n = 4, as well as the derived partition A∗. Vertical
lines indicate the positions x1i ,x
2
i ,x
3
i of the knives, i = 1, . . . , 4. Shaded in gray, for i = 1, . . . , 4, is the bundle
I
ϕ(i)
i selected by agent i as their favorite bundle in Ai ; here ϕ(1) = 2,ϕ(2) = 1,ϕ(3) = 4,ϕ(4) = 3.
j ∈ [n − 1], the item y j is placed in bundle I j+1∗ in case (a) above, and it is placed in bundle I j∗ in case
(b). So the resulting partition is well-dened: every item is allocated to exactly one bundle.
An EF2 allocation. We rst show that the partition (I 1∗ , I 2∗ , . . . , In∗ ) is such that agents’ expectations
about the value of the bundles I j∗ are approximately correct (namely, correct up to two items):
ui (I j∗) > ui (I ji ) > ui (B j ) for every agent i ∈ [n] and every j ∈ [n]. (5.5)
is follows by monotonicity of ui , since I j∗ = I
j
1 ∪ · · · ∪ I jn ⊇ I ji ⊇ B j by (5.4).
Now, based on the partition, we can dene an allocation A∗ by A∗(i) = Iϕ(i)∗ for each agent i ∈ [n].
us, each agent i receives the bundle in the complete partition corresponding to i’s most-preferred
index ϕ(i). We prove that A∗ satises EF2: For any pair i, j ∈ [n] of agents, we have
ui (A∗(i)) = ui (Iϕ(i)∗ ) > ui (Iϕ(i)i ) by (5.5)
> ui (Iϕ(j)i ) by (5.3)
> ui (Bϕ(j)) by (5.5)
= ui (A∗(j) \ {y j−1,y j }). by (5.4)
Hence, we have proved the main result of this section:
Theorem 5.4. On a path, for any number of agents with monotone valuation functions, a connected
EF2 allocation exists.
6 EF1 EXISTENCE FOR FOUR AGENTS
We have seen that Sperner’s lemma can be used to show EF2 existence for any number of agents.
Why does our proof in the previous section only establish EF2, and not EF1? e reason is that
agents’ expectations about the contents of a bundle might dier by up to two goods from what the
bundle will actually contain. In the notation of the previous section, an agent i may be presented
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with a partial partition Ii where the j-th bundle I ji is the basic bundle, i.e., I
j
i = B
j . e agent then
selects their favorite bundle from Ii , implicitly assuming that the j-th bundle in the rounded partition
I∗ will also equal B j , i.e., that I j∗ = B j . However, it may happen that in fact I
j
∗ = {y j−1} ∪ B j ∪ {y j },
and then i envies the agent who receives bundle j by a margin of two goods.
For four agents, we can adapt our argument to achieve EF1. To do this, we both change the way
we round the Sperner sequence into an allocation, and we dene new labeling functions that beer
anticipate how a partial partition will be rounded into the nal allocation. In this way, agents’
expectations about bundles will only ever be wrong up to one good. In crude terms, agents will
expect that each of the two interior bundles will be assigned at least one of the boundary items,
and the rounding method ensures that this will indeed happen.
Let n = 4. Formally, to dene the labeling function, for each agent i ∈ [n] we construct a virtual
valuation function uˆi (x , j) which assigns a value to each bundle j ∈ [n] of a partial allocation as
specied by a vertex x ∈ V (Thalf ). e way these virtual valuations are dened diers based on the
index j; in particular, end bundles (j = 1, 4) are treated dierently from interior bundles (j = 2, 3).
e virtual valuations are dened as follows, for each x ∈ V (Thalf ) and each i ∈ [n], where the
middle row (6.2) applies to j = 2 and j = 3:
uˆi (x , 1) =
{
ui ({1, . . . ,x1 − 1}) if x1 ∈ Z,
ui ({1, . . . ,x1 − 32 }) if x1 < Z.
(6.1)
uˆi (x , j) =
{
u−i ({x j−1, . . . ,x j }) if x j−1 ∈ Z and x j ∈ Z,
ui (I j (x)) otherwise.
(6.2)
uˆi (x , 4) =
{
ui ({x3 + 1, . . . ,m}) if x3 ∈ Z,
ui ({x3 + 32 , . . . ,m}) if x3 < Z.
(6.3)
us, for an interior bundle j = 2, 3, if both the items x j−1 and x j to either side of the bundle are
covered by a knife, an agent expects that one of these items (the less-valuable one) will be put into
bundle I j∗ of the nal rounded allocation (recall the denition of u−i in equation (2.1)). For exterior
bundles, j = 1 (resp. j = 4), if the item x1 (resp. x3) is not covered by a knife, the agent does not
expect the interior item (next to the knife) to belong to the nal bundle I j∗ , even though it belongs
to the observed bundle I ji . Otherwise, the virtual allocations are equal to ui (I j (x)), so the agent
expects that I j∗ = I
j
i . Later, we show that these expectations are correct up to one item.
Based on these virtual valuations, we dene labelling functions Lˆi : V (Thalf ) → [n] so that
Lˆi (x) ∈ {j ∈ [n] : uˆi (x , j) > uˆi (x ,k) for all k ∈ [n]}.
One can check that these valuation functions are still proper.
Again, by Sperner’s lemma, there exists an elementary simplex S∗ = conv(x1,x2, . . . ,xn) of
the triangulation Thalf which is fully-labeled according to our new labeling function: there is a
permutation ϕ : [n] → [n], with Lˆi (x i ) = ϕ(i) for all i ∈ [n]. Again, this elementary simplex induces
a Sperner sequence (A1, . . . ,An) of partial partitions.
To shorten an upcoming case distinction, we assume that y2 ∈ I 21 ∪ I 22 ∪ I 23 ∪ I 24 , i.e., that the
boundary item y2 appears in the second but not in the third bundle in the Sperner sequence. is
assumption is without loss of generality, since by the le-right symmetry of the denition of the
virtual valuations, if necessary we can reverse the path P and then consider the same elementary
simplex with vertices ordered in reverse (x4,x3,x2,x1); it will still be fully-labeled.
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With this assumption made throughout the rest of the argument, we now round the Sperner
sequence into a complete partition (I 1∗ , I 2∗ , I 3∗ , I 4∗ ) of P dened as follows:
I 1∗ := I 11 ∪ · · · ∪ I 14 , I 2∗ := I 21 ∪ · · · ∪ I 24 , I 3∗ := B3 ∪ {y3}, I 4∗ := B4.
Depending on the placement of the boundary item y1, we will either have I 1∗ = B1 or I 1∗ = B1 ∪ {y1};
and either I 2∗ = {y1} ∪ B2 ∪ {y2} or I 2∗ = B2 ∪ {y2}. e key property of these choices is that each
interior bundle (j = 2, 3) receives at least one of the boundary items adjacent to it.
e main part of showing that the partition (I 1∗ , I 2∗ , I 3∗ , I 4∗ ) can be made into an EF1 allocation is
an analogue of (5.5), which shows that agents’ expectations about their bundle are approximately
correct. e analogous statement is the next proposition, which is proved by case analysis.
Proposition 6.1. For each agent i ∈ [n] and every j ∈ [n], we have ui (I j∗) > uˆi (x i , j) > u−i (I j∗).
Proof. We consider each bundle j = 1, 2, 3, 4 separately.
• Suppose j = 1.
– Suppose x1i ∈ Z. en y1 = x1i and B1 = {1, . . . ,x1i − 1}. us ui (I 1∗ ) > uˆi (x i , 1) =
ui (B1) > u−i (I 1∗ ), since I 1∗ is either B1 or B1 ∪ {y1}.
– Suppose x1i < Z. en uˆi (x i , 1) = ui ({1, . . . ,x1i − 32 }). Now, either
∗ y1 = x1i − 12 so that y1 ∈ I 1i , and so I 1∗ = B1 ∪ {y1} = {1, . . . ,x1i − 12 }, or
∗ y1 = x1i + 12 so that y1 < I 1∗ , and so I 1∗ = B1 = {1, . . . ,x1i − 12 }.
In either case, I 1∗ = {1, . . . ,x1i − 32 ,x1i − 12 }, so ui (I 1∗ ) > uˆi (x i , 1) > u−i (I 1∗ ).
• Suppose j = 2, and suppose that I 2∗ = B2 ∪ {y2}
– Suppose x1i ∈ Z and x2i ∈ Z. So x1i = y1 and x2i = y2. en uˆi (x i , 2) = u−i ({y1, . . . ,y2}).
us ui (I 2∗ ) > uˆi (x i , 2) > u−i (I 2∗ ) since I 2∗ = B2 ∪ {y2}.
– Otherwise uˆi (x i , 2) = ui (I 2i (x)). Since y1 < I 21 (x) (because y1 ∈ I 1∗ ), we have that I 2i (x) is
either B2 or B2 ∪ {y2}. So ui (I 2∗ ) > uˆi (x i , 2) = ui (I 2i (x)) > u−i (I 2∗ ) since I 2∗ = B2 ∪ {y2}.
• Suppose j = 2, and suppose that I 2∗ = {y1} ∪ B2 ∪ {y2}.
– Suppose x1i ∈ Z and x2i ∈ Z. So x1i = y1 and x2i = y2. en uˆi (x i , 2) = u−i ({y1, . . . ,y2}).
us ui (I 2∗ ) > uˆi (x i , 2) = u−i (I 2∗ ) since I 2∗ = {y1} ∪ B2 ∪ {y2}.
– Otherwise uˆi (x i , 2) = ui (I 2i (x)). First note that I 2i (x) , B2: this is because both y1 and
y2 appear in the second bundle of the Sperner sequence (by the case and the wlog
assumption), so that x1i 6 y1 and y2 6 x2i . Since at least one of x1i or x2i is not integral, at
least one ofy1 ory2 must be in I 2i (x). Hence I 2i (x) is either {y1}∪B2∪{y2} or {y1}∪B2 or
B2∪{y2}. In each case,ui (I 2∗ ) > uˆi (x i , 2) = ui (I 2i (x)) > u−i (I 2∗ ) since I 2∗ = {y1}∪B2∪{y2}.
• Suppose j = 3.
– Suppose x2i ∈ Z and x3i ∈ Z. So x2i = y2 and x3i = y3. en uˆi (x i , 3) = u−i ({y2, . . . ,y3}).
us ui (I 3∗ ) > uˆi (x i , 3) > u−i (I 3∗ ) since I 3∗ = B3 ∪ {y3}.
– Otherwise, sincey2 does not appear in I 31 (x) (by our wlog assumption), we have that I 3i (x)
is either B3 or B3∪{y3}. Nowui (I 3∗ ) > uˆi (x i , 3) = ui (I 3i (x)) > u−i (I 3∗ ) since I 3∗ = B3∪{y3}.
• Suppose j = 4.
– Suppose x3i ∈ Z. en y3 = x3i and B4 = {x3i + 1, . . . ,m}. us ui (I 4∗ ) > uˆi (x i , 4) =
ui (B4) > u−i (I 4∗ ), since I 4∗ = B4.
– Suppose x3i < Z. en uˆi (x i , 4) = ui ({x3i + 32 , . . . ,m}). Now, either
∗ y3 = x3i + 12 so I 4∗ = B4 = {x3i + 32 , . . . ,m}, or
∗ y3 = x3i − 12 so I 4∗ = B4 = {x3i + 12 , . . . ,m}.
In either case, ui (I 4∗ ) > uˆi (x i , 4) = ui ({x3i + 32 , . . . ,m}) > u−i (I 4∗ ). 
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Now again, based on the partition, we can dene an allocation A∗ by A∗(i) = Iϕ(i)∗ for each
agent i ∈ [n]. us, each agent i receives the bundle in the complete partition corresponding to i’s
most-preferred index ϕ(i). We prove that A∗ satises EF1: For any pair i, j ∈ [n] of agents, we have
ui (A∗(i)) = ui (Iϕ(i)∗ ) > uˆi (x i ,ϕ(i)) by Proposition 6.1
> uˆi (x i ,ϕ(j)) since Lˆi (x i ) = ϕ(i)
> u−i (Iϕ(j)∗ ) = u−i (A∗(j)). by Proposition 6.1
Hence, we have proved the main result of this section:
Theorem 6.2. On a path, for four agents with monotone valuation functions, a connected EF1
allocation exists.
For ve or more agents, we were not able to construct a combination of labeling functions and a
rounding scheme that ensures that agents’ expectations are correct up to one item. In the four-agent
case, each interior bundle is adjacent to an exterior bundle (which helps in the construction), but
for ve agents, there is a middle bundle whose neighboring bundles are also interior.
7 EF1 EXISTENCE FOR IDENTICAL VALUATIONS
A special case of the fair division problem is the case of identical valuations, where all agents have
the same valuation for the goods: for all agents i, j ∈ N and every bundle I ∈ C(V ), we have
ui (I ) = uj (I ). We then write u(I ) for the common valuation of bundle I . e case of identical
valuations oen allows for more positive results and an easier analysis. Indeed, we can prove
that, for identical valuations and any number of agents, an EF1 allocation connected on a path is
guaranteed to exist. We further show that such an allocation can be found in polynomial time.
Our argument, though intuitive, is not as straightforward as one might think. For example,
one might guess that in the restricted case of identical valuations, egalitarian allocations are
EF1. However, the leximin-optimal connected allocation may fail EF1: Consider a path with ve
items and additive valuations 1–3–1–1–1 shared by three agents. e unique leximin allocation is
(1, 3, 1–1–1), which induces envy even up to one good. e same allocation also uniquely maximizes
Nash welfare, so the Nash optimum also does not guarantee EF1. is is in contrast to the results
of Biswas and Barman [2018] who consider allocations of items into bundles that satisfy matroid
constraints (rather than our connectivity constraints), and nd that the Nash optimum satises
EF1 under matroid constraints and the assumption of identical valuations.
Maximizing an egalitarian objective seemed promising because it ensures that no-one is too
badly o, and therefore has not much reason to envy others. e problem is that some bundles
might be too desirable. To x this, we could try to reallocate items so that no bundle is too valuable.
is is exactly the strategy of our algorithm: It starts with a leximin allocation, and then moves
items from high-value bundles to lower-value bundles, until the result is EF1. In more detail, the
algorithm identies one agent i who is worst-o in the leximin allocation, and then adjusts the
allocation so that i does not envy any other bundle up to one good. e algorithm does this by
going through all bundles in the allocation, outside-in, and if i envies a bundle I j even up to one
good, it moves one item from I j inwards (in i’s direction), see Figure 6. As we will show, a key
invariant preserved by the algorithm is that the value of I i never increases, and i remains worst-o.
us, since i does not envy others up to one good, the allocation at the end is EF1.
Formally, a leximin allocation is an allocation which maximizes the lowest utility of an agent;
subject to that it maximizes the second-lowest utility, and so on. In particular, if the highest
achievable minimum utility is uL , then the leximin allocation is such that every agent has utility at
least uL , and the number of agents with utility exactly uL is minimum.
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I i I j−1 I j
Fig. 6. If i envies j even up to one good, Algorithm 1 takes an item out of bundle I j and moves it in i’s direction.
Algorithm 1 LEXIMIN-TO-EF1
Input: a path P = (v1,v2, . . . ,vm), and identical valuations
Output: an EF1 connected allocation of P
1: Let A = (I 1, . . . , In) be a leximin allocation of P
2: Fix an agent i with minimum utility in A, i.e., u(I i ) 6 u(I j ) for all j ∈ [n]
3: for j = 1, . . . , i − 1 do
4: if i envies I j even up to one good, i.e., u(I i ) < u−(I j ) then
5: repeatedly delete the right-most item of I j and add it to I j+1 until u(I i ) > u−(I j )
6: end if
7: end for
8: for j = n, . . . , i + 1 do
9: if i envies I j even up to one good, i.e., u(I i ) < u−(I j ) then
10: repeatedly delete the le-most item of I j and add it to I j−1 until u(I i ) > u−(I j )
11: end if
12: end for
13: return A
Theorem 7.1. For identical valuations on a path, Algorithm 1 nds an EF1 allocation.
Proof. For an allocation A = (I 1, . . . , In), write uL(A) := minj ∈N u(I j ) for the minimum utility
obtained in A, and write L(A) := {j ∈ [n] : u(I j ) = uL(A)} for the set of agents (losers) who
obtain this utility. For the leximin allocation Aleximin obtained at the start of the algorithm, write
u∗L := uL(Aleximin) and L∗ := L(Aleximin). Note that by leximin-optimality, for every allocation A we
must have uL(A) 6 u∗L , and if uL(A) = u∗L then |L(A)| > |L∗ |. Let i ∈ L∗ be the agent xed at the
start of the algorithm, and recall the denition of u− from (2.1).
Claim 1. roughout the algorithm, uL(A) = u∗L and L(A) = L∗.
e claim is true before we start the for-loops. Suppose the claim holds up until some iteration
of the rst for-loop, and we now move an item from I j to I j+1, obtaining the new bundles I jnew and
I j+1new in the new allocation Anew. en u(I jnew) > u−(I j ) > u(I i ) = u∗L , where the strict inequality
holds by the if- and until-clauses. Since no agent other than j has become worse-o in Anew, it
follows that uL(Anew) > uL(A) = u∗L . As noted, by optimality of u∗L , we have uL(Anew) 6 u∗L . Hence
uL(Anew) = u∗L . us, by optimality of L∗, we have |L(Anew)| > |L∗ |. Because agent j has not
become a loser (sinceu(I jnew) > u∗L as shown before) and no other agent has become a loser, we have
L(Anew) ⊆ L(A) = L∗. us L(Anew) = L∗, as required. e second for-loop is handled similarly.
Claim 2. Aer both for-loops terminate, agent i does not envy any agent up to one good.
For any j , i , agent i does not envy j up to one good immediately aer the relevant loop has
handled j, and at no later stage of the algorithm does I j change.
It follows that the allocation A returned by the algorithm is EF1: By Claim 1, we have i ∈ L(A),
so that u(I j ) > u(I i ) for all j ∈ [n]. By Claim 2, agent i does not envy any other agent up to one
good, so that u(I i ) > u−(Ik ) for all k ∈ [n]. Hence, for all j,k ∈ [n], we have u(I j ) > u−(Ik ), that is,
no agent envies another agent up to one good. 
22
Algorithm 1 can be implemented to run in polynomial time, because with identical valuations,
one can use dynamic programming to nd a leximin allocation in time O(m2n2), and the remainder
of Algorithm 1 takes time O(mn), since each item is moved at most n times. A slight speed-up
can be achieved by observing that the proof of eorem 7.1 only needed that the initial allocation
optimizes the egalitarian welfare uL and minimizes the cardinality of the set L of losers. Such an
allocation can be found by dynamic programming in time O(m2n).
e reallocation stage of our algorithm bears some similarity to an argument by Suksompong
[2017, eorem 2] which shows that a umax-equitable allocation exists. In a very recent paper, Oh
et al. [2018, Lemma C.2] proved independently, using an inductive argument, that EF1 allocations
on a path exist for identical valuations. eir procedure can also be implemented in polynomial
time.
8 CONCLUSION
We have studied the existence of EF1 allocations under connectivity constraints imposed by an
undirected graph. We have shown that for two, three, or four agents, an EF1 allocation exists if the
graph is traceable. For any number of agents, we also proved that traceable graphs guarantee the
existence of an EF2 allocation, and they guarantee the existence of an EF1 allocation with identical
valuations.
ere are several questions le open. Most obviously, we did not sele whether EF1 allocations
on a path exist for ve or more agents. Our Sperner-based technique for four agents seems to not
extend to ve agents. On the other hand, extensive computer sampling did not nd an example
where no EF1 allocation exists. One can also ask whether dierent topological restrictions (e.g. ,
cycles), or restricted preference domains (e.g., binary utilities) can allow us to obtain EF1 existence
guarantees for n > 5.
While many of our procedures admit ecient implementations for nding fair allocations, for
our results based on Sperner’s lemma we do not know of algorithms beer than a naive search
through all connected allocations. For divisible cake-cuing, Deng et al. [2012] proved that it
is PPAD-complete to nd an envy-free allocation. What is the complexity of nding an EF1 or
EF2 allocation in our seing of items arranged on a path? Moving away from paths, it would be
interesting to study the complexity of deciding, given a graph and (say) additive valuations of the
agents, whether there exists a connected EF1 allocation.
While we were able to characterize the class of graphs guaranteeing EF1 in the two-agent case,
we have no characterization for three or more agents. As shown in Example A.6, there are non-
traceable graphs that guarantee EF1. Understanding such examples, and designing EF1 procedures
for them, is an interesting research direction.
In the seing without connectivity constraints, it is possible to achieve eciency and fairness
simultaneously: the maximum Nash welfare solution yields an allocation that is both EF1 and
Pareto-optimal [Barman et al., 2018, Caragiannis et al., 2016]. In our model, this is unfortunately
impossible. Igarashi and Peters [2018] show that on a path there are instances where there is no
connected allocation which is EF1 and Pareto-optimal. ey also show that it is NP-hard to decide
whether such an allocation exists.
In this paper, we have only considered goods, with monotonic valuations. e seing where
some or all items are undesirable (so-called chores) is also of interest [Aziz et al., 2018, Bogomolnaia
et al., 2016, 2017, Meunier and Zerbib, 2018, Segal-Halevi, 2018]. In the model with connectivity
constraints, Aziz et al. [2018] showed that on a path, a connected Prop1 allocation always exists (a
weaker requirement than EF1). e existence of EF1 connected allocations in this more general
domain is an intriguing question. Recently, for cake-cuing, Segal-Halevi [2018] noted that
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Su’s approach using Sperner’s lemma is not applicable to establish the existence of an envy-free
connected allocation, when agents consider some parts of the cake undesirable. However, the
existence of such allocations can be proved using other methods [Meunier and Zerbib, 2018,
Segal-Halevi, 2018], and these may be translateable to the indivisible seing.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 MMS
e maximin share guarantee of an agent i ∈ N is
MMSi := max(P 1,P 2, ...,Pn )∈Πn
min
j ∈[n]
ui (P j ),
where Πn denotes the space of all partitions of V into n connected bundles. An allocation A is a
maximin share (MMS) allocation if ui (A(i)) > MMSi for each agent i ∈ N . (Note that the maximum
is taken only over connected partitions, so the MMS value could be lower than the standard
denition from the model without connectivity constraints.) Bouveret et al. [2017] showed that an
MMS allocation exists if the underlying graphG is a tree. On the other hand, MMS allocations need
not exist on a cycle [Bouveret et al., 2017, Lonc and Truszczynski, 2018] or on a complete graph
[Kurokawa et al., 2018].
Since we have seen that EF1 or EF2 allocations are guaranteed to exist on a path, it is natural to
ask whether we can additionally require MMS: on a path, does there always exist an allocation that
satises EF1 and MMS?
First, let us note that not every EF1 allocation is also MMS. For 3–1–1–1–3 and three agents, the
MMS value is 3 via the partition (3, 1–1–1, 3), but the EF1 allocation (3–1, 1, 1–3) gives the middle
agent a utility of only 1. In fact, one can show that this example is worst possible, for subadditive
valuations. Valuations ui are subadditive if for any bundles I , I ′, we have ui (I ∪ I ′) 6 ui (I ) + ui (I ′).
An allocation satises α-MMS for some α > 0 if ui (A(i)) > α ·MMSi for each agent i ∈ N .
Proposition A.1. For subadditive valuations, an EF1-allocation on a path guarantees 1/3-MMS.
Proof. Let A be an EF1 allocation, write Ij = A(j) for all j ∈ [n], and x some agent i . For each
j ∈ [n] \ {i}, let дj ∈ Ij be an item such that ui (Ii ) > ui (Ij \ {дj }). We show that ui (Ii ) > 13 MMSi .
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a partition of the items into n bundles such that ui (P j ) > MMSi for each
j ∈ [n]. Since there are n bundles in P but only n − 1 items дj , there must be some bundle Pk such
that дj < Pk for all j ∈ [n] \ {i}; we show that ui (Pk ) 6 3 · ui (Ii ).
Suppose for a contradiction that there are three distinct agents j1, j2, j3 ∈ [n] \ {i} such that
Pk ∩ Ijr , ∅ for r = 1, 2, 3. Since Pk and the Ijr ’s are all intervals of a path, the middle interval must
be completely contained in Pk , that is, Ijr ⊆ Pk for some r . Hence дjr ∈ Pk , contradicting the choice
of Pk . So Pk intersects at most two bundles from A other than Ii . us, for some j1, j2 ∈ [n] \ {i},
we have Pk ⊆ Ij1 ∪ Ii ∪ Ij2 \ {дj1 ,дj2 }, and thus by subadditivity,
ui (Pk ) 6 ui (Ij1 \ {дj1 }) + ui (Ii ) + ui (Ij2 \ {дj2 }) 6 3 · ui (Ii ).
Hence, we have ui (Ii ) > 13ui (Pk ) > 13 MMSi , as required. 
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Interestingly, using a similar proof, one can show that the two agents receiving the outer bundles
of the path both get at least half of their MMS value. is is also tight; consider 1–1–2–2–1–1 for
four agents, and the EF1 allocation (1,1–2,2–1,1).
If we do not restrict valuations to be subadditive, then EF1 does not guarantee α-MMS for any
α > 0: Consider a path P = (v1,v2,v3) of three items, and two agents with identical valuations u
dened so that u(I ) = 1 if I ⊇ {v1,v2} or I ⊇ {v3}, and u(I ) = 0 otherwise. en the MMS value is
1 via the partition (v1–v2, v3), but the allocation (v1, v2–v3) is EF1 and gives the le agent utility 0.
For graphs that are not a path, Proposition A.1 does not hold. For a complete graph (i.e., in
the absence of connectivity constraints), EF1 only implies 1/n-MMS [Amanatidis et al., 2018,
Caragiannis et al., 2016].
While we have seen that EF1 on a path does not immediately imply MMS, it does imply MMS
in many cases. e following lemma will be useful to show that the allocations produced by our
arguments in the main text all satisfy the MMS guarantee.
Lemma A.2. Suppose there are n > 2 agents, and the items are arranged on a path. Take any n − 1
items y1 < · · · < yn−1, and dene the bundles B1, . . . ,Bn as follows:
B1 = L(y1), B2 = P(y1 + 1,y2 − 1), . . . ,Bn−1 = P(yn−2 + 1,yn−1 − 1), Bn = R(yn−1).
en for any agent i , there is some r ∈ [n] such that ui (Br ) > MMSi .
Proof. Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a connected partition of the items (ordered le-to-right) so that
ui (P j ) > MMSi for all j ∈ [n]. Since there are n bundles in P but only n − 1 items y1, . . . ,yn−1,
there exists a bundle Pk in P that does not contain any y j . Writing Y = {y1, . . . ,yn−1}, we see that
there is some r ∈ [n] such that
(P1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pk−1) ∩ Y = {y1, . . . ,yr−1} and (Pk+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pn) ∩ Y = {yr , . . . ,yn−1}.
us, we have Pk ⊆ P(yr−1 + 1,yr − 1) = Br so that ui (Br ) > ui (Pk ) > MMSi . 
Theorem A.3. For a path, the EF1 allocations constructed by any of our methods guarantee MMS.
Proof. Discrete cut-and-choose protocol for two agents. Suppose Alice’s lumpy tie is vj . en,
using the denition of lumpy tie, a connected partition witnessing Alice’s MMS value is either
P1 = (L(vj ),R(vj ) ∪ {vj }) or P2 = (L(vj ) ∪ {vj },R(vj )). At the end of the procedure, Alice receives
either L(vj ) ∪ {vj } or R(vj ) ∪ {vj }. For either of these options, there is a bundle in P1 and a bundle
in P2 which are weakly worse. So Alice receives a bundle that satises her MMS value. For Bob, he
receives his preferred bundle among L(vj ) or R(vj ). ese two bundles are of the shape described
in Lemma A.2 with y1 = vj , so Bob’s choice satises his MMS value.
Moving-knife protocol for three agents. e allocation returned by the algorithm of eorem 4.2
guarantees MMS. To see this, rst suppose the algorithm terminates in Step 3 or Step 4(a). At
that step, the bundles L, M , and R are of the shape described in Lemma A.2 with y1 = v`+1 and
y2 = vr . e agent sle who receives L thinks that L is best among L,M,R (since he shouted), so by
Lemma A.2 agent sle receives his MMS value. e proof of eorem 4.2 shows that no other agent
envies sle (even without removing an item), so that every other shouter receives value at least
ui (L), meaning that player s receives at least her MMS value (since she shouted, she nds L weakly
beer than M and R). Finally, agent c does not envy any other agent (even without removing an
item), and so automatically receives at least his MMS value. Next, suppose the algorithm terminates
in Step 2. As the proof of eorem 4.2 shows, the agent sle does not envy either of the other
players, and hence receives at least his MMS value. Apply Lemma A.2 with y1 = v` and y2 = vr . It
follows that for every agent, one of L \ {v`}, M , or R provides at least the MMS value. But we know
from the proof any agent prefers either M or R to L \ {v`}, and we know that all agents i , sle
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receive a bundle weakly preferred to both M and R, so i receives his MMS value. Finally, suppose
the algorithm terminates in Step 4(b). Similarly to the argument for Step 2, apply Lemma A.2 with
y1 = v`+1 and y2 = vr . en, each player thinks that one of L, M , R provides the MMS value. By the
proof of eorem 4.2, agent sle receives a bundle weakly preferred to each of L,M,R, and agents
i , sle prefer either M or R to L, and receive a bundle that is weakly preferred to both M and R, so
they also receive their MMS value.
Identical valuations. Algorithm 1 gives each agent a utility of at least u∗L . By their denitions, the
MMS-value is the same as the optimal egalitarian welfare under identical valuations, i.e., u∗L = MMS.
EF2 via Sperner’s lemma. For each agent i , by Lemma A.2, there exists a basic bundle whose value
is at least MMSi . We showed that the allocation A∗ is such that agent i weakly prefers the bundle i
receives in A∗ to any basic bundle. Hence, A∗ is an MMS allocation.
EF1 for four agents via Sperner’s lemma. For each vertex x i of the full-labeled simplex S∗, invoke
Lemma A.2 with y1 = bx1i c, y2 = bx2i c, y3 = dx3i e. By case-analysis one can check that uˆi (x i , j) >
ui (B j ) for each j = 1, 2, 3, 4, where the B j are dened like in Lemma A.2. By Proposition 6.1, we
have that ui (A∗(i)) > uˆi (x i ,ϕ(i)) = maxj ∈[n] uˆi (x i , j) = maxj ∈[n] ui (B j ) > MMSi . 
A.2 Example of an instance with no EFX allocation
We dene EFX as follows.
Denition A.4 (EFX (Envy-freeness up to any outer good)). An allocation A satises EFX if the
envy is bounded up to the least valuable outer good, i.e., for any pair i, j ∈ N of agents, and for any
good u ∈ A(j) such that A(j) \ {u} is connected, we have ui (A(i)) > ui (A(j) \ {u}).
Example A.5. Consider the instance 2–3–1–3 for three agents. is instance admits no connected
EFX allocation: It is clear that no allocation in which some bundle is empty satises EFX. In (2,
3, 1–3), the le agent envies the right agent even aer removing the outer good of value 1; in (2,
3–1,3), the le agent envies the middle agent even aer removing the outer good of value 1; and
in (2–3, 1,3), the middle agent envies the le agent even aer removing the outer good of value 3.
One can also consider the instance 1–1–3–3 for two agents.
A.3 Example of a non-traceable graph that guarantees EF1
Example A.6. Consider a star with three leaves in Figure 7. We will divide the graph among three
agents. Consider the allocation where each agent chooses the most favorite leaf-vertex among the
unallocated vertices in order, with the last agent in that order being assigned to the central vertex
of the star. e resulting allocation satises EF1, since the envy towards agents allocated to a single
item can be bounded up to one good, and the rst and second agent do not envy the third agent if
one removes the central vertex from his bundle.
Fig. 7. A star that guarantees EF1 among three agents.
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